explicitly reactionary, identified with their anxieties. Where Carter, an equally progressive candidate when it came to race, was willing to imply he had these voters' best interests in mind where Sanders did not, Sanders steadfastly refused to suggest, even as election rhetoric, that he would subvert federal law or personal principle.
Sanders' attorney, Norman Underwood, put it this way in a 2008 oral history of state politics.
It's important in understanding that election to understand the atmosphere we had in 1970. In the 60s we had a lot of progressive-at the federal level-social legislation. We had the Voting Rights Act and the Public Accommodations Law, and in the history of the country in the twentieth century it's pretty clear that the 60s was a time of great movement forward. What is clear now that was less clear then is that underneath all this progress there was something of a backlash. There usually is. But just below the surface of the Georgia electorate there was a kind of churning resentment against the progress that had been made and Carl Sanders, because of the image he had, and because of his friendship with Lyndon Johnson, who had been the president who brought about most of that legislation, had a vulnerability being associated with that progress. And Jimmy Carter, State Senator Jimmy Carter, understood that very well and played to it and exploited it. . . . . 2 By March 1968 Carter also began to construct a strategy that would paint Sanders not only as an anti-George Wallace integrationist, 3 but also as a nouveau riche urban liberal, and a man who had clearly profited from his tenure as governor. Carter had learned well from Lester Maddox, an Atlanta entrepreneur and vocal segregationist who won the governor's office in 1966 by employing proven populist strategies-hammering at progressive social politics and financial corruption in government. Jimmy Carter had been This image of Sanders, like Carter's peanut farmer persona, had some truth to it.
The forty-four-year-old Sanders was a Georgia success story-he had risen from economic hardship to become a state senator at twenty-nine and governor at thirty-seven-and he relished his image as one of the New South's most socially progressive, business-oriented
leaders. Yet on leaving office in 1967 (Georgia governors were then limited to one term), he stayed in the capital city and built his law practice there rather than in his hometown of Augusta, making inevitable amongst Georgia's rural populists the criticism that he was a "slick Atlanta lawyer." He flew his own plane, wore well-tailored suits, and cultivated the distant, cool demeanor of the experienced leader. Aides would say that even in the height of a Georgia summer, they never saw him sweat, and there are few in Georgia politics who would suggest this is something the electorate admires. 4 One problem in trying to "humanize" Sanders was his reaction to the camera.
Sanders could sense the presence of a camera the way a bird dog senses a covey of quail. Even before the film started rolling, Sanders stiffened into another personality. He posed, sometimes 24 hours a day. The ad agency found that out when it hired a photographic team to follow the candidate four consecutive days to film him in unguarded moments, times when he was genuinely himself, times when the voters looking at TV would believe he was human, not a ruthless robot. Approximately five hours of film were shot on those four days. When edited, five minutes of pure, unguarded, "humanized"
Carl Edward Sanders were available for a TV spot. Norman Underwood, who was Sanders' campaign attorney and ran for governor himself several years later, remembered the ads vividly, and believed they were impressive but not persuasive, and far too esoteric for campaign spots-Sanders jogging in Atlanta's Piedmont Park, flying planes, and having a game of handball, were hardly activities the common Georgia voter in 1970 could identify with, and talking with a farmer in a cornfield appeared forced to audiences who saw Sanders as a big city lawyer. The overall campaign, moreover, had taken the tone of the Maysles' direct cinema-style ads:
it was ambiguous in message.
In contrast, Carter's campaign employed clear statement, and used it in the attack: being governor had made Carl Sanders too rich and too "city" to care about most of Georgia. The Carter campaign also employed ambiguity in the form of strong suggestion, much like modern push polling. Carter's ads suggested that Sanders was courting the black vote. In addition, fact sheets were distributed showing a photograph of Sanders among the Atlanta Hawks, the basketball team in which he held ownership, with one of its black players pouring champagne over Sanders' head after a winning season.
Atlanta Constitution columnist Bill Shipp at the time observed that using such an image to indict Sanders, an image involving not only race but alcoholic celebration, was political dirty pool. While those close to him denied that Carter was playing the race card, he
clearly impressed many observers otherwise, and Shipp noted that "race was the silent issue," as Carter remade himself in the image of the working class white Georgian. "The grim-faced factory workers who brushed past Carter in the grey dawns of Spring 1970
found that by the following September Carter stood for everything they did, hated everything they did, lived and looked like they did. At least that's the way he seemed on television. And they elected him governor." At the end of a long campaign, I believe I know our people as well as anyone.
Based on this knowledge of Georgians North and South, Rural and Urban, liberal and conservative, I say to you quite frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over. Our people have already made this major and difficult decision, but we cannot underestimate the challenge of hundreds of minor decisions yet to be made.
Our inherent human charity and our religious beliefs will be taxed to the limit. No poor, rural, weak, or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity of an education, a job or simple justice. The film in the Sanders collection is still being fully assessed, although we believe most of the Maysles reels have been identified. Along with the finished commercials and dozens of pieces of elements, we have identified fourteen picture reels, about 5,500 feet in total, with what we believe are matching magnetic soundtracks. Limited playback resources and competing institutional priorities make discovery of these a slow process, while there is no preservation budget for film. Thankfully, the film community has taken note. Because of the efforts of Dan Streible and Cineric (particularly Diana Little), the finished spots were preserved. It is our hope to do the same with the remaining reels over the coming years as funding permits, so that we may create an accessible resource that speaks to turning points in filmmaking, advertising, and Georgia politics.
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